Project name: AL3283
Date of interview: 15 June 2009
Location of interview: Olympus, Pretoria
Language/s of interview: Afrikaans
Length of interview: 15 minutes 58 seconds
Name of Interviewer: De Wet Potgieter
Name of interviewee/s: General Chris Thirion
Name of translator (if any):
Name of transcriber: De Wet Potgieter
Notes on access and use (if any):
Audio file name/s of interview: AL3283_PTA_THIRIONCHRIS_20090615

Interviewer Ek sit hier met generaal Chris Thirion, die destydse adjunk-hoof van staf inligting (HSI) van die Suid-Afrikaanse weermag. Generaal, ek wil net graag vandag met jou gesels oor die aanloop na die afdanking destyds wat later genoem was die suiwering van FW De Klerk van sy weermag toe jy en ʼn reeks senior offisiere in 1992 summier afgedank was.
Ek sal net graag met jou wil gesels oor die aanloop, hoe dit begin het en die gevoel wat jy gehad het oor die feit dat hoekom daar nie ʼn krygsraad was nie, hoekom was daar enige steun van bo-af van jou generaals wat jou bygestaan het.
Chris Ja, De Wet, mmm, eintlik is dit nou ʼn onderwerp en ek is baie ernstig as ek dit sê dit is eintlik ʼn onderwerp wat mens swaar oor praat want daar is nog rowe, jy weet, en as jy die rowe afkrap dan is die seer maar nog rou en so aan.
Die feit van die saak is, ek het dertig jaar was ek in die weermag en ek het myself gesien as ʼn goeie, professionele, lojale soldaat en dan as jou loopbaan dan só beёindig word met afdanking, dan is dit maar dan is genesing dan ʼn lang proses.
Maar ek dink mens kan nie oor die insident praat sonder om ook die politieke klimaat van die tyd in aanmerking te neem nie. Daar het ʼn klemverskuiwing plaasgevind en ons het aangestap van, of die keuse was volkskaalse oorlog of ons onderhandel en ons kry ʼn politieke oplossing.
Dis natuurlik so dat oorlog en militêre optrede nooit die finale antwoord kan bied vir staakundige, politieke probleme nie. Ons was as jong offisiere geleer dat ons taak en ons doel is om interne klimaat te skep om voldoende te wees vir onderhandelings na ʼn politieke oplossing toe.
En ek het my nooit as synde in ʼn poisisie gesien waar ek ʼn soldaat is en my taak is om apartheid vir ewig te beskerm of so iets nie. Jongmense wat onder my gedien het sal almal kan getuig. Ek het altyd vir mense gesê ons rol, ons taak, ons doel is om te verseker dat daar ʼn binnelandse klimaat waarbinne by wyse van onderhandelings oplossings gevind kan word.
En daarom het ekke mnr. De Klerk se inisiatiewe ondersteun. Wel dit was nou ook nie sy inisiatiewe nie, ons weet dit is die inisiatiewe wat al voor hom begin het. Maar ek het die inisiatiewe gesteun. Hy’t miskien gekom en dapperder en dapperder optredes geneem en dit het ek gesteun tot die mate dat ek onder my kollegas bekend gestaan het as synde ʼn De Klerk-man.
Nou is dit ironies dat dit die ou is wat my in die pad steek, jy weet, maar, nou ja, dit alles maak dit ʼn ingewikkelde saak om mee saam te leef. Feit van die saak is mnr. De Klerk was hoof van die, as staatspresident, hoof van die weermag. Dit het hom die reg en die gesag gegee om offisiere aan te stel en af te dank.
So hy kon gedoen het wat hy gedoen het, maar hy het redes gegee hoekom hy my en 22 ander ouens, ons was 23 in totaal, waarvan ek die mees senior ou was. Hy het redes verskaf waaroor ons dienste beёindig is en dit was nie korrek nie. Daarmee kon ek nie saam lewe nie.
Ek het vir mnr. De Klerk ʼn brief geskryf, per geregistreerde pos, waarin ek vir hom gesê het ek aanvaar sy beslissing as ʼn soldaat. Hy het die reg om my diens te beёindig. Ek het vir hom gesê ek weet nie op grond waarvan hy so opgetree het nie, en ek het ook vir hom in die brief gesê dat ek versoek tog om gekrygsraad te word of, en ek het geweet mnr. De Klerk het voorbehoude oor enigiets wat ʼn militêre konnotasie gehad het daai tyd.
En ek vir hom gesê of enige ander vorm van formele regspleging en ek sal berus by die uitspraak van so ʼn hof of ʼn krygsraad. Kort en die lank van die storie is ek het nie eens ʼn antwoord op my brief gekry nie.
Nou ja, ek het begin deur te sê ʼn mens moet dit sien teen politieke klimaat van die tyd. Ek weet dat in daai tyd, want ek het agterna van mev. De Klerk persoonlik verneem, dat mnr. Mandela by elke geleentheid wat hy met mnr. De Klerk te doen gehad het vir hom gesê jou weermag is buite beheer.
Daar is ʼn derdemag wat intern optree en wat baie probleme veroorsak en wat nie baie jou inisiatiewe ondersteun nie en wat die, kom ons sê, politieke proses, die konstitusionele proses sal wil verongeluk.
Dit het oor ʼn tyd geloop. Mnr. De Klerk het daarna navraag gedoen. Dit is ontken, altyd en by geleentheid het mnr. Mandela vir hom gesê maar daai derdemag sit in militêre inligting, die brein van die derdemag is in militêre inligting.
Nou hierdie goed het maar oor ʼn tyd geloop. Mnr. De Klerk dink ek het nie sy eie veiligheidsmagte vertrou nie, maar hy het ook nie ʼn ernstige saak daarvan gemaak, dis my persoonlik opinie, hy het nie ʼn taak daarvan gemaak om dinge vas te vat en, jy weet, dit behoorlik te hanteer nie.
Ek dink in my beskeie mening as ʼn staatspresident met sulke goed gekonfronteer word dan kan hy doodgewoon ʼn hoofregter inroep, hy kan sy betrokke minister inroep, hy kan sy hoof van sy weermag inroep en in die teenwoordigheid van ʼn hoofregter kan hy die vrae vra wat hy wil vra en daarop aandring dat die antwoord as ʼn geswore, onder eed, affidavit aan hom gelewer word.
Dis nooit gedoen nie. ʼn Mens moet onthou dit gaan hier vir die pylvak vir ʼn politieke oplossing en nou is hier nog ʼn klomp militêre ramifikasie wat vir mnr. De Klerk eerder ʼn hindernis as ʼn hulpmiddel was en ons kom uit ʼn oorlogsituasie uit waar ons in ons buurlande weerstandsbewegings ondersteun het, bewapen het, opgelei het.
Dis nie meer geheime nie. Ek was gemoeid daarmee. Ek was gemoeid met operasies wat gemik was teen bepaalde teikens. Daai teikens was later nie meer net fisiese teikens nie en was ook persoonlikhede, persone ensovoorts. En ek dink die feit dat mnr. De Klerk ver verwyderd gestaan het van sy veiligheidsmagte het ʼn optrede tot gevolg gehad waar daar gebruik gemaak gewees het van regter Goldstone bv. om sekere ondersoeke teen die weermag te doen, teen militêre inligting, want die brein van die derdemag sit dan nou binne-in militêre inligting ens.
Dit is waar ek dink regter Goldstone afgekom het op sekere goed afgekom wat ongemaklikheid veroorsaak het- ernstige ongemaklikheid veroorsaak het by mnr. De Klerk. En a.g.v. van ek dink die resultate van hierdie, kom ons noem dit nou maar by gebrek aan ander hierdie Goldstone-ondersoek, het hy toe goed geag om vir regter Goldstone hulp van binne die weermag te kry.
Van daar dat generaal Steyn op die toneel verskyn het. Ek onthou nog baie goed dat ek, na dit gebeur het, vir generaal Steyn gesê het dat hy kan staat maak op my volle samewerking en as daar dinge is wat hy oor wonder of wil uitklaar, ek is beskikbaar.
Daar is nooit ʼn enkele woord met my gevoer nie. Ek dink hy het hom verlaat op ʼn klomp skinderstories van die kant van nasionale intelligensie se kant af. Nie die organisasie as ʼn geheel nie, maar beplaade indiwidue daarbinne en ook van binne die weermag. Ek besef maar vandag dat ek binne my eie geledere ook maar dat daar ʼn dolk in die rug was- van binne my eie geledere.
Toe ek top cover nodig gehad het was daar niks nie, jy weet.
Interviewer As jy praat van top cover. Wat, kan jy vir my ʼn vergelyking tref. Waar, hoekom en wie sou beter na jou kon gekyk het as omstandighede dit so wou hê?
Chris Ek sou sê ek het binne ʼn bevelstruktuur gefunksioneer en binne daai bevelstruktuur het ek my opdragte gekry en uitgevoer, enne binne daai bevelstruktuur het ek gerapporteer. So dit is dat ek agter iets wil skuil nie, maar wat ek sê is dat ek dink die klagtes wat baie ernstig was, wat onder andere ook gepraat het van moord en die beplanning van ʼn staatsgreep en sulke goed. Ek dink byvoorbeeld dat dit regverdig in militêre terme dan ten minste ʼn krygsraad en ek weet nie of die senior offisiere die sogenaamde nag van die generaals in mnr. De Klerk se kantoor was, of hulle oorbluf was en of hulle uit hul diepte was of wat ookal nie. En of hulle nou werklik geglo het ek is met onheilighede besig waarvan selfs hulle nie eers weet nie.
Maar daar was niemand wat gesê het maar kyk as dit klagtes is teen Chris Thirion is dan stel ons voor dat ons maar hom op verpligte verlof sit en krygsraad. Dit sou vir my aanvaarbaar wees.
Interviewer Maar dit het nie gebeur nie
Chris Dit het nie gebeur nie. Met ander woorde die ouens bokant my in die bevelslyn. So wat ek net wil sê is dat die bevelslyn waarbinne ek gefunksioneer het moes darem die manlikheid gehad het om te sê dis nie reg wat ons nou doen nie. Jy weet, ek wou nie gehad het die ouens moes vir my instaan of my beskerm nie.
Interviewer Maar ʼn krygsraad sou jou geleentheid gebied het.
Chris Ja, presies. Dit is wat jy doen, dit is hoe dit werk. En jy weet daarna is daar gelieg toe daar navraag kom oor ons ontslag onder meer oor myne is daar gesê dit het nou gepaard gegaan met ʼn herstrukturering binne die weermag, wat blatant lieg was.
Interviewer En die wyse wat FW die hele ding benader het. Was dit aanvaarbaar gewees vir jou?
Chris Nee, glad nie. Hoegenaamd nie. En ek sal seker so lank as wat ek leef nie daarmee kan vrede maak nie.
Interviewer En jy is nooit van enigiets aangekla nie?
Chris Nooit nie.
Interviewer Dit moes maar net weer verbygaan.
Chris Dit moes maar oorwaai. Jy weet, ou het ʼn gesin. Jy het ʼn vrou, jy het kinders. Jy moet hulle in die oё kyk. En nou gaan die lewe aan. En ek was ʼn goeie en professionele soldaat vir 30 jaar. Die laaste paragraaf van my loopbaan sê ek is ontslaan. Toe ek mnr. De Klerk wou dagvaar. Ek het hom trouens gedagvaar. Ek het hom gedagvaar. Toe het hy gevra ons moet buite die hof skik. En toe het hy op skrif gesit dat ek nie skuldig was aan enige van daai aantygings teen my nie.
Interviewer Maar die skade was gedoen?
Chris Nee, die skade is gedoen.
Interviewer Hoekom het hy dit gedoen?
Chris Presies. Daai verantwoordelikheid moet hy maar aanvaar en die ouens wat hom bygestaan het.
Interviewer Maar hy sal vir die res van sy lewe daarmee moet saamleef?
Chris Ja.
Interviewer Maar dink jy hy voel sleg daaroor?
Chris Nee, ek dink nie so nie. Nee wat, ag, ek dink hy gaan maar aan met sy lewe en ek dink...
Interviewer Soos water van ʼn eend se rug?
Chris Ja, en ek dink dit geld vir van my oud-kollegas ook. Hulle slaap gelukkig daaroor.

Project name: AL3283 Date of interview: 15 June 2009 Location of interview: Olympus, Pretoria Language/s of interview: Afrikaans Length of interview: 15 minutes 58 seconds Name of Interviewer: De Wet Potgieter Name of interviewee/s: General Chris Thirion Name of translator (if any): De Wet Potgieter Name of transcriber: Notes on access and use (if any): Audio file name/s of interview: AL3283_PTA_THIRIONCHRIS_20090615 Interviewer I am sitting here with general Chris Thirion, the then deputy chief of staff intelligence of the South African defence force. General, I would like to talk to you today about the lead up to the dismissal in, what was later named as the purge by FW De Klerk of his defence force, when you and scores of senior officers were summarily fired in 1992. I would like to talk to you about this lead up to the event, how it all started and how you felt about the fact that there was never a court martial held, was there any support from the top by your generals in supporting you? Chris Yes, De Wet, it is actually a subject, and I am very serious when I say this, it is actually a subject that one talks about with difficulty because there are still scars, you know, and when you open those raw wounds it still hurts and so on. The fact of the matter is that I served for thirty years in the defence force and I saw myself as a good, professional, loyal soldier and then when your career ends with dismissal, the healing process takes a long time. But I think one cannot talk about the incident without taking the political climate at the time in consideration. There was a shift in emphasis and we were on the way of two choices. The one was a full scale war or we negotiate and secure a political solution. It is, of course, obvious that war and military action never offers a final solution for political problems. We were taught as young officers that it was our task and our goal to create an internal climate to allow for negotiations towards a political solution. Therefore I never saw myself in a position where it was my duty as a soldier to uphold and protect apartheid forever. Young men who served under me can vouch for this. I always told people that our role, our duty, our goal was to ensure that a climate was created within our borders whereby solutions could be reached through negotiations. And that is why I supported Mr. De Klerk’s initiatives. Well, it was in any case not his initiatives; we all know it was the initiatives that started even before his time. But, I did support those initiatives. Maybe he came forward with more courageous and more courageous steps, and I supported him to such an extent that I was known amongst my colleagues as being a ‘De Klerk man’. Now, it is so ironic that it was that same man that fired me, you know, but in any case this makes it even more so difficult to live with. The fact of the matter is that Mr. De Klerk was as state president the head of the defence force. This gave him the right and the authority to hire and fire officers. So he could do whatever he wanted, but he gave reasons why he dismissed me and 22 others, we were 23 in total, of which I was the most senior. He gave reasons why he ended our services and that was not correct. That I cannot accept. I could not live with it. I wrote a letter for Mr. De Klerk, registered mail, telling him that I accept his decision as a soldier. He had the right to fire me. I told him I do not know on what terms he had done it, and I also told him in the letter I want to be court martial. I knew then that Mr. De Klerk had his reservations about anything with a military connotation at that time. And I told him or any other form of formal administration of justice and I will let the matter rest with the findings of such a court or a court martial. I did not even get a reply on my letter. Ja well, I started off by saying one must see this in the political climate of the time. I knew, during that time, because I heard afterwards from Mrs. De Klerk in person, that Mr. Mandela at every meeting he had with Mr. De Klerk told him that his defence force was out of control. There is a third force that operates internally and a lot of problems create, and did not support your initiatives en what, let us say, who wanted to derail the political process, wanted to derail the constitutional process. This happened over a time and Mr. De Klerk enquired about it. It was denied, always, and at one time Mr. Mandela told him that the third force was in military intelligence, the brain behind the third force was inside military intelligence. Now, these things developed over some time. I think that Mr. De Klerk did not trust his security forces, but he also did not make a serious issue about it, that is my humble opinion, to pull things together, you know, to handle things properly. In my humble opinion when a state president is confronted with such serious allegations, he should call in his chief justice, he could summon his relevant minister, he could call in his chief of the defence force, and then in the presence of the chief justice ask the questions he wanted answers on and demand that the replies should be provided to him in the form of sworn affidavits. That was never done. One must bear in mind, this is the final lap for a political solution and now there are these military ramifications hindering him rather than helping him and we have come out of a war situation where we supported, trained and armed resistance movements in neighbouring states. This is no longer a secret. I was involved in it. I was part of operations aimed at particular targets. Those targets were later on not only physical targets, but later on became individuals, people in particular. And I think the fact that Mr. De Klerk was very far separated from his security forces, resulted in him making use of judge Goldstone for example to do lead certain probes into the defence force, into military intelligence, because the brain of the third force was said to be within military intelligence etc. This is where I think judge Goldstone came across certain things that created unease- serious unease with Mr. De Klerk. And, as a result of these things, I think, let us call it the shortcomings of this investigation by Goldstone, he thought it well to find judge Goldstone help from within the defence force. This is where general Steyn came into the picture. I still remember very well, after this had happened, I told general Steyn he could rely on my full cooperation and if there were things he needed to clear up, I was available. There was never a single word discussed with me. I think he was led by a lot of gossip stories from national intelligence. Not the organisations as a whole, but particular individuals in this organisation and in the defence force. I realise today that there was also within my circles there was a dagger in my back- inside my own circles. When I needed top cover there was none, you know. Interviewer When you talk of top cover. What, can you make a comparison. Where, why and who should have looked better out for you if the circumstances deemed it necessary? Chris I would say I functioned within a command structure and from inside that command structure I received my orders and implemented it, and, within that command structure I reported back. So this does not mean that I am trying to hide behind something, but what I am trying to explain is that the charges that were very serious, which were amongst others murder and talks of a coup and such things. I think for example that in military terms at least a court martial was necessary and I do not know if those senior officers in Mr. De Klerk’s office that so-called night of the generals were completely overwhelmed or totally out of their depth, or whatever But there was nobody that said, but waits if these are the charges against Chris Thirion we recommend he must go on compulsory leave and be court martial. That would have been acceptable for me. Interviewer But, this did not happen? Chris It didn’t happen. In other words the guys above me in the line of command. So what I am trying to say is that the command structure within my line of duties should at least have had the manhood to say that is not right what we are doing. You know, I didn’t want the guys to stand in for me or protect me. Interviewer But a court martial would have given you an opportunity. Chris Yes, exactly. This is what you do, this how it works. And you know lies were told when questions were asked afterwards about our dismissals and it was said about mine that it was part of a restructuring within the defence force, it was a pack of lies. Interviewer And the way that FW handled the whole issue. Was that acceptable for you? Chris No, not at all. And I will never, as long as I live make peace with it. Interviewer And you were never charged for anything? Chris Never. Interviewer It just had to go away. Chris It had to blow over. You know, one has a family. You have a wife, you have children. You have to look them in the eyes. And now life must go on. And I was a good and professional soldier for 30 years. The last paragraph of my career says I was fired. When I wanted to sue Mr. De Klerk. I, in fact did sue him. He requested to settle out of court. And then he put it in writing that I was not guilty on any of those accusations against me. Interviewer But the damage was done. Chris No, the damage was done. Interviewer Why did he do it? Chris Precisely. He must take responsibility for what he has done and the people who assisted him. Interviewer But he has to live with this for the rest of his life. Chris Yes. Interviewer Do you think he feels bad about it? Chris No, I don’t think so. No, I think he just carries on with his life. Interviewer Like water from a duck? Chris Yes, and I think it applies for some of my former colleagues. They sleep with peace at night.